01.
Approaches
02.
Methods
03.
Target analysis
04. Means analysis
05. Promoter analysis
06.
Political economy
07.
Welfare economy
08.
Order analysis
09.
Order conception
10.
Order dynamics
Structure:
1
The question of the economic theory
2
The question of the teaching of the economic policy
3
The question of the political economics
4
The question of the welfare economy
5
The question of the order theory
6
Economic complementary sciences
1
The question of the economic theory
In this
first chapter the different approaches used in economics shall be analyzed. The
individual approaches will respectively be discussed with a concrete problem
area.
A first
approach is found in the general economic theory. It sees itself as a positive
theory which aims to demonstrate how the problem sizes occurring in the economy
are actually influenced and how to explain the determinants of this problem.
Often
is spoken of the causes of economic events. These events are then understood as
effects of these causes. So which events have triggered e.g. inflation?
Though,
the idea of the determination reason goes beyond that one of the cause.
Although every event to be analyzed, is probably triggered by one or also
several causes. Nevertheless it must be expected a different course of the
problem sizes with the same cause to be analyzed, since it depends on further
attendant circumstances as a cause which have an effect on the problem sizes to
be examined.
We
look at the course of a billiard ball e.g.. The way a billiard ball takes is
not only determined by the strength the billiards player exerts on the ball. If
e.g. an obstacle faces the ball, the direction of the ball is changed. The
composition of the billiard table also decides how strong the friction losses
are and how far this ball will roll.
We
have to assume also in the economic area that the variables to be analyzed are
determined by several factors in general. What price on a free market adjusts
ultimately depends not only on the manufacturer, but also on the demand side as
well on the framework of its economic system which limits the state.
When
we speak of causes, a distinction is made between the variable that triggered
(caused) the process to be tested and the sizes which change these forces
triggered (caused). Hitherto the analysis is limited to speak of functional
contexts. In this case it is not clarified which of these sizes in a functional
relationship, are a cause and what different size to be called action.
Thus,
e.g., in an empirical study can be noted that the increase of the domestic
product is often accompanied of an increase in prices of goods. With this
realization it is not yet clear, what the cause and what the effect is. It
would be possible that price increases have caused the entrepreneur to invest
more and to produce more because of this expected increase in profits, thus
price increases have triggered growth in the domestic product. It would also be
conceivable that precisely because the demand for products has risen and the
offer is indeed extended, but that providers will need time to adapt production
to the increased demand that therefore arise initially demand overhangs and for
this reason prices are increasing. Here would in other words the fact that the
supply of goods cannot keep up with the goods demand, causing price increases.
Empirical
studies alone can only disclose functional relationships, they say in itself
alone nothing about who has initiated this process, the price the quantity or
the quantity the price. The knowing, however, we need in this context, clearly
refers to the cause-effect relationship. The grievance occurring in the public
can only be eliminated if we know what size is the causing and which other
variable is the size caused.
The
hypothesis: ‘All businessmen maximize their profit’ can obviously be disproved
if we find only one single businessman who does not behave after this maxim.
However, a real verification of this hypothesis is impossible. Even if we
manage to study all today and in the past living entrepreneurs on this behavior
and even if we had not a single entrepreneur found who does not behave
according to this maxim, it would still be reckoned with the possibility that
in the future an entrepreneur is found that does not behave according to this
maxim. We must expect the possibility that, till now, all examined businessmen
have only therefore behaved after this maxim because they were exposed to quite
certain compulsions which perhaps are no longer present in future.
Such
a compulsion could lie e.g. in a strong competition which the businessmen survives
as a businessman only if they exhaust all profit opportunities. In this case
the hypothesis under discussion has to be amended to the effect that the profit
maximizing behavior is contended only under the condition, that businessmen are
in competition relations.
But
the problem is not solved with this correction. Since we live in an environment
changing again and again it must always be expected with the possibility that,
in future unknown data will occur which make a correction of our hypotheses necessary
and this means that this hypothesis is not valid for all times. Our actual
knowledge about the empirical legitimacies is left more or less incompletely
and this has the consequence on the other hand that we cannot verify any
hypothesis empirically for all times.
2 The question of the teaching of the economic
policy
A second philosophy comes into play in the context
of the teaching of the economic policy. The protagonists of the economic policy
are the politicians. The teachers of the economic policy, however, do not trade
as politicians, they rather analyse the actions of the economic politicians. It
is primarily all about the question how the philosophy of the 'pure' economic
theory is different to that one of the teacher of the economic policy.
We have seen that the economic theorist always
searches for cause - effect relationships. Either he starts out from a certain
mostly unwanted event and examines which are the reasons for this event. So he
could ask the question, which causes have triggered the mass unemployment
appearing in the reality.
And he could get to the result that unemployment
was triggered by the sinking of the economic situation.
Or else he checks which effects start out from
quite certain events. So he also could ask himself the question, which
consequences a lessening of the economic upswing would have on the worker
employment. In the two cases the very same cause - effect relationship is analyzed only with the difference that this process is
checked one time by the effect, and a second time by the cause.
In the context of the economic policy, however,
targets and means are under discussion. The politicians pursue a certain
target. They want to counteract e.g. the mass unemployment. The discussions
which precede the employment political activities of the politicians refer
besides the question of the desirability of this politics particularly to the
question on which way, hence with which means (instruments) the politicians try
to carry out this target. It could be discussed on the political level e.g. the
question if the mass unemployment can actually- as claimed by John Maynard and
his followers- be removed or at least reduced significantly, as a result that
the state increases his expenditure and this additional expenditure is not financed with fiscal resources but
with loans of the central bank.
Hence at the level of the economic theory the
cause-effect relationships are under discussion. In the focus of the economic
policy and thus natural also of the teaching of the economic policy is the
target-means relationship.
It is of decisive importance now that these two
relation couples (cause-effect respectively target-means) are narrowly
connected to each other. We can just go on even another step and notice that
both relations actually base on the same connection only from two different
approaches. In connection with this, it is spoken about a socio-technical
restatement: The cause-effect relation stated in the economic theory is
redrafted socio-technically into an target-means relation. We bring an example:
The economic theorist John Maynard Keynes came due
to its analyses at the conclusion that unemployment can be explained in a very
first line by a fall in the private demand. Whether this theory actually
corresponds to reality, we want to leave undecided at this point. As it is well
known, the hypotheses formulated by Keynes and his disciples are controversial
in the area of economic science. However, here it is not about question whether
this is an empirically confirmed theory, but only to the quite different
question how the findings of economic theory can be converted into political
measures. And then it is all about to show that both the theorist, who speaks
about causes and effects - as well as the politician who is looking for
suitable remedies (measures) for a certain economic policy target, actually
start off from the very same relation.
Economics and finance in the grand coalition in the
seventies of the Federal Republic of Germany makes the attempt to boost the
economic situation again by an expansion of the public expenditure financed in
deficit, then he refers to the employment theory developed by Keynes. He
understands unemployment as an effect of a decline in the private demand as a
reason for this unwanted event. And he plans to remove this cause by the fact
that instead of the private, declining demand the state demand is expanded.
Formulated positively the economic theory
understands the demand for goods as a reason for the height of the occupation.
In the context of the economic policy a certain effect on the labour market:
The rise of the occupation is aimed. And to accomplish this target it is
attempted as a remedy for this target to boost the cause of the level of
employment: The demand.
Therefore we can assume that the economic policy
also starts off by causes and effects, only that the cause is just not
representing the real problem variable like in the economic theory but is
corrected consciously and the effect is not considered as a date but shall be
corrected by the politics. Instead we speak about target and means; we also can
speak about intended effects and causes induced consciously. The target is the
intended effect; the means are the change caused consciously in the causes.
This also shows why
we had to point out at the outset that a study of economic policies requires of
the knowledge of economic theory. And that within the framework of the doctrine
of economic policy it is never possible to give correct answers by which means
certain economic policy objectives can be addressed.
Let us consider
again the question why for economic assessment of the political policy measures
it is not sufficient to consider economic theory. And why it requires an
independent teaching - separated from the economic theory. The reason for this
is that the mere knowledge of economic theory is not sufficient to apply this
knowledge to concrete political problems.
Suppose again the
example of Keynesian employment theory.
This theory can
provide us information, whether a deficit-financed increase in expenditure of
the state actually helps to eliminate unemployment, what conditions possibly
must be present, that this measure also leads to success and to what extent the
deficit in the national budget must reach, so that the desired success also can
occur.
In reality it is, however, not at all so easy to
determine clearly, whether all preconditions listed in the economic theory for an
occupation increase are actually fulfilled. We take the case that unemployment
has increased strongly, that a fall was detected in the private consumption
demand at the same time and that one of the preconditions which must be given
is fulfilled, so that the Keynesian theory can be applied with success.
Now the employment
theory often is not able to indicate whether there are not also other causes
which may trigger unemployment.
So we assume
e.g. that a rapid increase in the raw material costs or a defect in the
education of the employees also can be seen as a possible cause of
unemployment. If the raw material costs have risen at the same time it is not
clear from the outset which of these two events (fall in the private
consumption demand or increase in the raw material costs) is responsible for
the increase in unemployment and which measures will be able to increase the
level of employment. However, other causes necessitate other measures.
Furthermore the assessment of a political-economic
measure does not confine itself to the clarification, how efficient a certain
measure will be with regard to the aim, which shall be carried out with this
measure. We must rather assume that almost all measures we would execute in
politics, but also in other areas, influence not only the variable which is
meant to influence with this means but yield
also side effects on other variables which are striven in a national
community too.
Primarily when these secondary effects are negative
therefore impair the realization of other targets; it is not sufficient to ask
only for the efficiency of a measure with regard to the target striven with
this means. Only clarifications on the extent to
which other objectives of economic policy are affected by this measure, the
conditions are met to make a statement about the desirability of this measure.
Now in the economic theory a decisive difference
consists in the question how efficient a certain means is and with which
unwanted side effects it has to be calculated. Even if we cannot be sure at any
time that we already know all causes of a certain phenomenon, after all, a
theory raises the target to detect all the possible causes. An employment
theory can only just then be considered satisfactory if it lists all regulation
reasons for unemployment.
However, there is no theory comparable with the
employment theory which lists all possible side effects of a measure. The
increase in the deficit of the national accounts budget can have a negative
effect on the price level. Whether, or under what
conditions this is the case, is not clarified in the context of the employment
theory, but the theory of inflation.
Furthermore an increase in the deficit of the
national accounts budget can lead to an unwanted increase in the share of the
collective goods in the domestic production. In turn this question is not in
the focus of the employment theory but is examined in the context of the
welfare economy.
But it is not just
that there is no theory, which lists all secondary effects of a political
measure so that in such a way the possible secondary effects of a measure are
cleared in the most different places of economics. The study of the single
areas of the economic theory leads very well to that it is searched after further
regulation reasons of an event while there is no method which makes possible
the uncovering of further, hitherto
unknown secondary effects.
Indeed, if we still
do not know all the causes of unemployment, for example, in applying this
theory we will very soon encounter employment changes which cannot be resolved
with the hypotheses previously known. So here there is a strong motive to
further investigate these unknown determinants of employment. Only then if in
the reality no greater unemployment appears which cannot be explained
satisfactorily with the previous employment theory, this theory has achieved a
satisfactory condition and the researchers can turn to other problem sizes.
But there is in
finding possible secondary effects no comparable method to detect additional
side effects of a particular event.
While a
special theory like e.g. the employment theory in general remains easily
comprehensible, so that the occupation theorist is not overtaxed in the task of
finding new regulation reasons. But the scientist who searches for side effects
which are further and not known until now has to find possible side effects in
all possible sub-disciplines of economics. He therefore is, because of the very
strong specialization of science, not able anymore to know about all branches
as well as he could find further regulation reasons. It is therefore mostly
coincidence which have detected until now unknown side effects.
These difficulties are further intensified because
within the framework of efficiency analysis the relevant effect relationship is
happening within a relatively short period of time while secondary effects
often are visible only much later, after a few years, sometimes even after
several decades. It is relatively easy to clarify possible further determinants
of an event, if the relevant variables occur at the same time while it is very
unlikely that effect relationships that occur only after decades are recognized
at all. Also as a lack of theory there is no reason to see much later occurring
events as a direct result of measures which were introduced decades ago.
We take as an example the straightening of the
Rhine which was carried out in the 19th century and was considered very
successful at that time. This way it was possible to improve the Rhine into a
busy waterway. The success was immediate and visible to everyone.
Today, we know that exactly this straightening was
besides other causes the most important reason for the nowadays ascertainable
inundations. Because of these long-term visible side effects such straightening
will be no more seen as a measure which has improved overall welfare of the
German economy. The success in the improvement of navigation must be compared
with the billion high devastation due to inundations in relation with the
straightening of the Rhine. However, it passed a lot of time until the
inundations have ever been recognized as a result of the straightening of
rivers.
These considerations make further clear that
whenever in the policies the attempt is made to introduce measures intended to
combat a particular adverse event, as a
first step the question needs to be resolved, to what causes the undesirable
event can be attributed, that a political wants to fight. It is only then
possible to fight the unwanted event by fighting these causes with success. Who
resigns to ask in a first step for the causes of the event to be corrected,
will cure the symptoms and this has in almost every case the result that the
undesirable condition is not resolved.
Obvious as this conclusion may be, but politicians
mostly do not consider to follow this rule, instead try to remedy these
shortcomings by simply forbidding these shortcomings by law. For example, in
fighting the problem of the minimum payment, by politicians, instead of asking
in a first step for the causes of why nowadays many workers receive a wage
income, which is even below the cultural subsistence level, and then attempt in
a second step to resolve those causes, it is decreed by law that every employer
shall pay all workers a minimum wage.
Not enough that one failed to eliminate the root
causes of an identified problem, one even campaigns against those who indicate
that on this way the problem cannot be solved. One is pretending as if this was
a moral problem. And insinuates to the ones who describe these measures as
inefficient, to fight the target itself, that is to grant every employee at
least an income in height of the cultural existence minimum.
This target is, however, undisputed. Already the
constitution establishes in the article 4 that the human dignity is inviolable.
The human dignity surely is not guaranteed for everyone who does not obtain any
regulated income which at least corresponds to the cultural subsistence level.
However, at the realizing of the uniform legal minimum wage it is not all about
the aim, which is undisputed, but only
about the question, whether a proper solution was found this way, which
one is efficient to grant a minimum income to every citizen on one side, and on
the other side does not lead to strong unwanted side effects at other aims of
the economic policy of the same importance.
If one arrives namely at the conclusion that these
two conditions are not satisfied, a proper solution of the present problem is
just prevented this way. Just because one acts as if this problem is already
solved, the politicians turn to other problems and contribute that the
unsatisfactory situation in this area lasts.
It is tried now and then to notice some weeks after
the introduction of the legal minimum wage that the law is already successful.
However, this observation is not possible this way at all. It is not claimed by
the critics of this solution at all that the inefficiency or the secondary
effects feared enter immediately after the introduction of this measure.
Quite the reverse: when in the long run a measure
must be described as unsatisfactory, there is a good chance that initial
successes appear, too. There are several reasons for it. Just because the
politics will try to take care that the law is also followed by everybody at
the times immediately after the introduction of a measure, those which suffer
losses due to this law will keep still at first to not stand out and be
accused, too.
Furthermore it needs also certain time, until the
ones involved have ascertained at all which consequences a law will have for
themselves and how big the to be feared damage turns out. Some time passes
again until those which suffer losses, and therefore look out for ways to avoid
these losses, have finally found such new ways to avoid these losses.
We have already mentioned above that secondary
effects appear mostly only after some time. We take the example of the
Keynesian manpower policy. As hardly another economics idea the Keynesian
revolution was seized by politicians. There is hardly a major market-based
organized economy, in which the politicians did not made the attempt to fight
unemployment on a large scale by means of the instruments provided by Keynes.
Indeed noteworthy early successes came immediately
after introduction of this policy. For example Karl Schiller in his capacity as
Economic and Finance Minister in the sixties could lead the BRD out of the
crisis quite successfully with his Keynesian Go and stop -
policy .
Today after over 80 years experience with a
Keynesian manpower policy the judgement looks much more down-to-earth. It has
not been successful to remove the mass unemployment or to reduce it to an at
least considerable extent. The mass unemployment has probably even risen. A
clear judgement is not possible since we had not had any exact statistics yet
to the size of unemployment in the thirties of the 20th century.
That the Keynesian employment policies could be
considered successful in the short term, although it has not been successful in
the long term, does not depend on the fact that the politicians have not
properly followed the scientific recipes . On the contrary, the Keynesian
recipes were in almost all major economies implemented one-to-one, it was not
taken half-measures.
If success failed to appear, this was because the
economic agents adapted to the new situation and just these adjustment
processes led to the case that long term successes failed to appear. The
initial success can be explained that the additional orders of the state to the
industry, increased the profit expectations of entrepreneurs and this increase
of earnings expectations has led to increased production. With the production
the demand for workers also increased, unemployment was dismantled.
The trade unions, however, reacted very soon to the
changed situation. The profits therefore increased primarily because the
increased demand for goods led very fast to price increases. In turn due to
these price increases the real incomes of the employees were reduced, the share
of the pay incomes in the complete domestic production was reduced
simultaneously, too. The trade unions got active and put an adaptation of the
nominal wages to this changed situation in the collective bargaining following
on this.
To the extent, though, the trade unions were able
to implement this adjustment in the nominal wage rates, earnings expectations
fell back to its previous level. Therefore, the entrepreneur also had no reason
to continue with the expansion of production and neither with the more demand
for labour.
If the entrepreneurs, though, have got clear once
that the state employment policy cannot improve the profits at all on a long-term
basis, they also will adapt to the changed situation. Even then, if they can
hope for temporary precedes increases in connection with the state employment
policy until the adjustment of the trade unions; this politics will not induce
the entrepreneurs to hire new workers any more in future. Due to often rigorous
dismissal protection legislation, though, the entrepreneurs are not able to
dismiss the newly hired workers any more, if it turns out that because of
renewed reduction of the production fewer employees are needed. In this case
the entrepreneurs try to run the additional public orders by overtime of the
already busy employees or shift the production in other countries in which the
labour costs turn out lower.
This example shows
that the success of a policy measure can only be detected when it has become
clear how the economic subjects respond to these measures. However,
the reactions of the private economy subjects to state measures always need
certain time.
3
The question of the political economics
Subject of this introductory lecture are
surely the difficulties, which arise from the attempt to apply the knowledge of
the economic theory for solution of political-economic problems. Therefore the
essential features of the teaching of the economic policy will be in the centre
of this lecture, either. And in the centre of this teaching are targets and
means difficulties.
This, however, does not mean that in this lecture
also other philosophies do not attain meaning. First we have already seen that
without knowledge of the economic theory the task of the teaching of the
economic policy cannot be tackled satisfactorily at all. How the individual
measures of economic policy are to be judged, can be carried out only ever with
knowledge of the cause-effect relationships in the context of economic systems.
However, in connection with this there are also
further philosophies of importance. This applies primarily to the so-called
political economics. This further philosophy goes back on certain suggestions
Joseph Alois Schumpeter. This had compared the
political events with the operation of a market economy in a representative
democracy in his publication over capitalism, socialism and democracy.
Until the emergence of the modern economics by Adam
Smith in the ending 18th century economic problems were discussed almost
exclusively under the point of view, which behaviour of the businessmen should
be expected under the point of view of the public welfare. Schumpeter now made
aware that only the actual effect relationships were detected within a market
economy system, as it was noted, that the majority of entrepreneurs base their
decisions by the extent thereby their own well-being is affected. The
liberalism had now shown that macroeconomic undesirable developments can just then be fought and prevented if it is investigated and the actual motive
powers of economic activity are shown, and indicates that under certain
conditions the public welfare then can be realized even if everybody does not
have the public welfare in mind at all his decisions.
In the same way it has to be recognized, however,
that in a representative democracy also the politicians are primarily
orientated to their own interests and that the actual political events can only
be detected if it is taken note of this actual behaviour of the politicians.
Just as entrepreneurs pursue to maximize their profit in all its decisions, it
must take note that the politicians in an even manner haggle for votes in the
general elections to the Parliament.
This change of approach in the assessment of policy
decisions now by no means signifies an abandonment of realization of public
welfare. Equally, as Adam Smith had shown that under the conditions of general
competition finally the on self-interest
oriented behaviour of individual economic agents is channelled in a way that
entrepreneurs are also producing the goods that are just in demand by consumers, as well it can
be shown that in a representative democracy, the interests of the people are
just then considered best possible when the politicians are striving to attain
a maximum of votes in the general election.
Of course, it applies here that the realization of
public welfare can only be guaranteed if certain preconditions are fulfilled.
Here again in the system of representative democracy, there are mechanisms that
allow channelization of the politicians interests towards the interests of the
entire population.
In both societies (in a representative democracy,
as well as in a market economy) to the leaders (entrepreneurs as well as
politicians) are guaranteed to make their decisions freely, but this does not
mean that all possible alternatives may be taken. Every social system requires
an order in which the always valid values are described and which specify that
alternatives that violate these social values are not allowed.
The liberal order is not injured yet, because a
certain public-endangering behaviours are prohibited, but only when the state
is attempting to take the pending economic decisions into its own hands, and
thus dictates the economic individuals what must be done. In a liberal order
the principle is that everything is allowed, what is not specifically
prohibited (reasons of public welfare) while
in a bureaucratic-political system it is traded according to the motto
that everything is prohibited, what is not specifically allowed.
But in what way comes this newer approach to the
political economy in our context into play? The economic theory is often made
the reproach that the requirements which provide the economists to politicians
cannot be fulfilled because the politicians often subject to certain
constraints, due to which the advice of economists cannot be complied with.
So economic theory may point out e.g. that
inflation can only be avoided if it is possible to align the money supply on
the total amount of goods produced. This thesis still may be so right,
nevertheless it must be taken note of that politician would possibly lose the
majority in the next elections, when they would align their decisions with
these conclusions and that therefore the politicians could not take the advice
of the scientists just for these reasons.
The political economics could possibly bring remedy
here. This branch of economics examines, among other things, what constraints
the politicians are exposed to and what advice of the pure economic theorist
does not get a chance therefore. The economic science should not be confined to
examine with what measures economic policy targets can be realized. In the
calculus of economics it should rather be included the question, in what ways
it is possible to pursue certain aims in a representative democracy
successfully.
The starting point of
these considerations is thus the knowledge that in a representative democracy,
the politicians base their decisions about how these measures impact on voting
relations in the next elections.
Only such measures can therefore be regarded as
realistic, which do not make re-election possibilities of politicians
impossible (improbable) at the outset.
So for example the political economy points out
that the electors align their vote decisions with the happenings immediately
before the election. The longer the period, since a particular measure has been
carried out, the less remember the voters to these occurrences, they forget
very quickly the measures which they have benefited from, but also the
measures, which have restricted their own welfare .
If we base on such behaviour of the electors,
surely unpopular measures which perform their positive effect only on a
long-term basis are not able to be carried out shortly before elections. On the
other hand just this elector behaviour allows the politicians to carry out also
unpopular measures shortly after the election, when the time period is
relatively large yet until the next choice.
These considerations also show that for the
enforcement of unpopular, but nevertheless necessary and welfare guaranteeing
measures it is imperative that legislatures are not set too short, since with
very short election periods unpopular measures can hardly be realized.
When the political economics starts from the thesis
that politicians just in functioning democracies always align their decisions
on the re-election possibility, this assumption may not be misinterpreted. The
thesis of the vote’s maximization actually refers less to the ultimate motives
which move the politicians. It would be wrong to interpret this thesis in a way
as if all politicians were bad people who are not ready to accept other
interests than their own ones at all. The thesis of the vote maximization
doesn't want to say anything at all about what motivates the individual
politicians, if they get politically active. The political economy claims about
the ultimate motives of the politically actives just as little as the economic
theory wants to have its thesis of the profit maximization understood in the
way that businessmen are exclusively morally reprehensible and most egotistical
personalities.
In the two cases (economic theory such as political
economy) these theses say something about the incentive systems to which the
executives are exposed. For the proper functioning of a market economy, the
mutual competition is crucial, without competition there are no satisfactory
results in a market economy. However, intense competition automatically forces
the entrepreneurs, each to choose the alternatives, in which all possible cost
reductions and hence earnings growth to be exploited. If a businessman being in
the competition does go without possible profits, he gets into the danger, to
be outdone by competitors and just therefore go bankrupt. This compulsion to
take advantage of all profit opportunities is just the vehicle that ensures in
a market economy, that everything possible is done to guarantee the welfare of
the population.
And similar relationships can be noticed with
regard to the votes-maximizing behaviour of politicians. Just because the politicians
in a functioning representative democracy are under the compulsion to make all
of their decisions the way that they have great chances of being re-elected in
the next election, it is guaranteed at the same time that politicians base
their decisions on what the voters want in their majority. Also here, this
obligation (this incentive system) does not automatically mean that politicians
always act amoral and act in reality past the common good. The opposite is the
case, provided of course that the political order ensures that the conditions
for alignment of democracy to the public welfare are also met.
Continuation
follows!