01. Approaches
02. Methods
03. Target analysis
04.
Means analysis
05.
Promoter analysis
06. Political economy
07. Welfare economy
08. Order analysis
09. Order conception
10. Order dynamics
0th Introduction
1th The question
about the concretization of means
2th The question
about the intrinsic value of means
3th The question
about the efficiency of means
4th The question
about negative secondary effects
5th The question
about the market conformity of means
6th The political
feasibility of means
0th Introduction
This
section deals with the question of which contribution the economic policy
teaching can make in connection with the question of what means shall be used to
achieve a given economic policy aim. We have already pointed out that this
question can by no means be answered solely by science, that the question of
the appropriate means for a given aim can not be deduced only from factual
connections, which can be clarified definitely on the part of science, that
here always value judgments play a part, too, which can only be rendered by the
politician who uses these means.
Now,
what are the issues which the science can answer in the scope of the means
analysis?
Firstly,
it must be clarified in which the essential properties of the means up for
discussion exist anyway (question of the concretization).
Secondly,
the question arises whether the politicians (the public) grant a positive or a
negative intrinsic value to the means up for discussion (question of the
intrinsic value).
Thirdly,
it is necessary to clarify whether and to what extent the means to be used are
also able to achieve the desired effects (question of efficiency).
Fourthly,
it is to check whether the intended use of means leads to undesired or even
desired side effects at variables that should actually not be affected
(question about the secondary effects).
Fifthly,
it is to clarify whether the individual means are in conformity with regard to
the existing economic system, that is whether, resulting from the existence of
a market economy order, the means to be used has to be considered as
market-compliant (question of market conformity).
Sixthly
and finally, we must also reckon with the possibility that certain means
recommended by science are not allowed due to the constitution of a state and
that is just why they are not up for discussion. It is common knowledge that
Keynesians recommend to combat cyclical unemployment thereby that the state
expands its expenditures and finances these additional expenditures not by
taxes, but with credits from the central bank. However, such a deficit in the
state budget is not permitted in accordance with the Basic Constitutional Law
since a while. Such measures (deficit-financed government expenditure
increases) can therefore not be introduced in Germany.
Nevertheless,
it must be allowed to demand fundamental law changes, which also allow such
measures, as long as the scientist is convinced that these measures do not
violate the fundamental values of our order and are therefore prohibited
unjustly in the Basic Constitutional Law.
1th The question
about the concretization of means
Let us
begin with the question of the concretization of a means. Similarly, as in the
definition of an economic policy aim also in the context of a means analysis it
is to clarify as a first step, wherein the characteristics of the particular
means consist. However, the concealment trend that we have seen in the context
of the aim analysis is given less to the means. It is rather primarily about
that means may have significant and insignificant qualities and that only such
means appear suitable which possess the essential characteristics.
The
question of the necessary properties can only be answered on the basis of a
theory. A theory shows how determining factors can be traced back to an
economic event. Within the scope of the policy, the issue is to bring about a
specific, desired event and therefore this event becomes the aim. The means is
then exactly appropriate to bring about this desired condition when its
properties apply to the necessary and sufficient determinants.
Let us
make these theoretical considerations clear to us in a practical example. Politicians
would pursue the aim to participate workers in operations side acquisition of
assets and to increase their total income in this way. Up to discussion would
be the introduction of a participation wage. If the means of participation wage
is chosen, then a part of the wages is saved compulsorily for the workers,
those savings remain either in the company which applies this participation
wages or are transferred to credit institutions.
Let us
consider the characteristics of a participation wage more closely. A
participation wage could be granted by a company without a contract, and thus
without any commitment. This property is indeed of great importance for the
question of which rights the worker receives, if he can possibly sue for the
participation wage. For the question of whether an actually granted
participation wage is, though, able to increase the total income of workers,
this question is of minor importance, in this economic context it does
not count to the essential characteristics of the participation wage.
Now,
if we put the theory of distribution developed by Kaldor as a basis, we have to
insinuate that an increase in the employee income is only achieved when the
savings rate of the employees’ increases; so we need to verify whether a
participation wage causes the saving rate of the employees to rise. The
participation wage is not paid to the employee, but saved compulsorily, so one
will able to insinuate that the savings rate of the employee is raised at least
temporarily, and that therefore an essential prerequisite is created for that
the participation wage leads to success. This means that the coercive character
of the participation wage is one of the essential characteristics of the
participation wage; it is the compulsion that triggers the desired effect.
However,
it must be seen that an employee who has savings already, has the option to
dissolve his previous savings; in this case, the savings rate of the employee
does not rise or not to the full extent. It must also be taken into account
that at each investive wage scheme the blocking
period expires some day and the employee receives the right to dissolve the
savings. Only if there are good reasons that employees do not entirely dissolve
their savings after the blocking period, the savings rate of employees has
increased in the long term and only then it can be expected that the investive wage achieves its purpose also in the long term.
2th The question
about the intrinsic value of means
In and
of itself, means are not introduced for its own sake, but in order to achieve
indirectly other superordinate aims. In its capacity as means, means initially
do not have any intrinsic value. Nevertheless, it must be expected that
measures that are used as means are not only considered as means, but can also
obtain an intrinsic value, namely a positive or negative value. Initially, let
us make this relationship clear to us with an example from the private sphere.
An
enterprise would pursue the primary aim to achieve the highest possible profit.
The profit could in certain circumstances also be increased in that the said
entrepreneur defrauds or extorts his customers or suppliers. Therefore the
fraudulent behavior or the extortion would be in fact a means to increase the
profit of the enterprise. Nevertheless, no one could recommend to an
entrepreneur to resort to these means and one will sanction such behavior.
Fraud and extortion are matters of fact which are classified as criminal and
not even the highest material success can justify the use of these means. So we
adjudge a high negative value to this kind of means.
If on
the other hand an entrepreneur is willing to donate generously for the
education of children from developing countries, so this donation may be
discussed, among other, under the aspect that generous donations could raise
the image of this entrepreneur and that in this indirect way even the sales
volume could increase. Important is in this context, however, to note that this
donation has not to be judged only, and
not even severely, from the view point whether this desired increase in sales
volume is expected, one will see much more a positive intrinsic value in the
donation as such.
These
connections also apply to the use of political means. Again, we have to assume
that certain measures as such are judged to be positive or negative, regardless
of their effects. So the Keynesian theory recommends providing a deficit in the
national budget in order to increase employment. The national debt is, however,
considered by many people as something negative, regardless of whether it can
be assumed that a national debt produces positive effects on employment.
Now,
what is the contribution of economic policies teaching in this context? Of
course, science is not capable to prove such a review as incorrect. It is the
right of each citizen or politician to reject a particular activity - in our
case the national debt - as such. Here, it is essential to consider that such assessments
in turn have their specific causes. This negative assessment of government debt
could derive therefrom that firstly one assumes that a debt of a private
household is undesirable and that what is true of households, could neither be
wrong for public budgets.
Here,
science can demonstrate that this reasoning is based on incorrect conclusions.
First, it can be shown that a debt of a private budget is only undesirable if
the loans are provided only for consumption and when it can not be assumed that
the budget could expect increases in income in the near future.
This
consideration must not be simply transferred to the debt of public budgets. A
significant difference between the debt of a private and a public budget is
that the household incurs debts to another business entity and burdens this,
while the state incurs debts to its citizens, thus effectively to himself.
One
can add very well some points against a national debt; so price-raising effects
may arise from a deficit, future generations may be affected if the government
debt leads to case that the readiness to risky investment decreases.
3 The question
about the efficiency of means
The
central question within the means analysis refers to the suitability of
economic policy means. When speaking of the contribution of science to the
means problem, one generally thinks of the suitability question. The
relationship between theory and politics results - as already indicated - from
a socio-technical reformulation. The aim-means relationship corresponds to the
cause-effect relationship, the aim is the intended effect, the means the set
cause.
An
efficiency analysis can here be approached from three sides:
Firstly,
one may ask whether a given means is suitable for achieving a specific aim.
Here aim and means are given, it is asked for the theoretical relationship
between these two variables. For example, based on the theory of distribution
shall be examined if the given aim: Wage ratio increase can be achieved by the
introduction of the means: participation wage.
Secondly,
one can ask for the characteristics that a means is required to have to allow
that the given aim can also be realized. Here the aim and the relevant theory
are considered to be given, it is asked for how a suitable means has to look
like.
Thirdly,
one could also ask the question, which aims could be achieved with a given
instrument. Here the aim is the problem size to be examined; here the means and
the theory to be applied are given.
Now,
one can distinguish between an absolute and a comparative efficiency analysis.
Within the scope of the absolute analysis one confines oneself to check
whether a very specific instrument is able to achieve the aim. So could, for
example, a representative of the neoclassical theory come to the conclusion
that a reduction of the key interest rate of the central bank would be able to
boost the economy.
Within
the scope of a comparative efficiency analysis, several instruments are
checked for effectiveness and it is investigated, which of the means under
discussion comprises the highest efficiency. Let us take again the example of a
planned economic recovery. To be available would be now on one side a reduction
of the key interest rate of the central bank and on the other side a
deficit-financed increase in government purchases.
Here,
a Keynesian will suggest choosing the means of increase in government
purchases. With an interest rate reduction there is the risk that private
investors do not respond to the interest rate reduction as hoped with an
increase in investment volumes. In times of recession the elasticity of
investment demand would namely be low because on one side, due to the strong
competition in product markets, interest rate reductions would have to be
passed on in the goods price. And on the other side, since in times of
recession all production capacities are underutilized in any case due to
decline in consumer demand, the entrepreneurs are not interested in increasing
the capacity any further. In contrast, the effect of a deficit-financed
increase in government purchases would be sure, so that an expansionary fiscal
policy would lead to success in any case.
Furthermore,
one can distinguish between a qualitative and a quantitative
efficiency analysis. At a qualitative analysis one confines oneself to check
whether a positive effect on the aim variable has to be expected at all. At a quantitative
analysis, however, it is also about how much the instrument variable has to be
raised in order to achieve the desired effect.
However,
such a quantitative analysis presupposes that both, the aim and the use of
means can be quantified and that the underlying theory enables a quantifiable
relationship. Let us bring again the example of the economic recovery. The aim
consists in an intended increase of the domestic product of 12 billion. The use
of means, the government expenditure increase, can also be measured in monetary
units and the relied Keynesian theory of the multiplier permits the conclusion
that, under the given conditions (i.e., for example, at a savings rate of 25%),
an increase in government spending of 3 billion would be necessary for an aim
realization.
Generally,
it is assumed that within the scope of a policy which intends to influence the
economic process, the quantifiability of aims and
means is given, while under the regulatory policy one often has to be confined
to a qualitative analysis.
Within
the scope of the quantitative analysis also the problem of critical thresholds
is broached. We can not expect that the relationship between the aim- and means
variable is continuous and proportional, rather we have to assume that means
often do not have an effect at all until a certain extent, because e.g. in the
case of a too small extent, the addressed public does not yet take note of
these measures. So may minimal interest rate reductions fizzle out in their
effects.
On the
other hand it has to be reckoned that at some instruments from a critical
height on the effect turns into its opposite; so a duty rate increase will lead
to additional receipts in customs duties only up to a critical limit. Duties
are namely added usually to the product price, but if the elasticity of demand
is greater than one, then the price increase will be overcompensated by the
reduction in quantity, the sales and with it the customs receipts then go back
despite duty rate increase and price increase.
Finally,
a third distinction is of importance: One can distinguish between static
and dynamic efficiency analysis. At the static analysis we confine
ourselves to how the equilibrium variables in the aim variable change due to
the use of means. An increase in government expenditures by € 1 billion would
lead after the attainment of a new equilibrium to an increase of the domestic
product of say € 3 billion.
If one
expands, however, the consideration to a dynamic analysis, so one will also
examine which time it takes for a used means at the point in time (t1) to have
an effect on the aim variable. Such an analysis requires that projections about
the course of the aim size are possible and, moreover, that it is known how
long the to be examined effect process takes between means application and aim
size. If we can assume e.g. that a government expenditure increase will affect
the level of income only within 1 1/2 years, so this knowledge can only be used
if one can prognosticate how the income will change within 1 1/2 years. Because
only in this case the means application can be dosed properly.
The
efficiency analysis is then faced with difficulties when measures are under
consideration, which are introduced for the first time. Then there is a lack of
empirical values about which influence is actually emanating from the newly
applied instrument. So at the first launch of the participation wage it was
unknown how the employees will behave when the blocking period expires and the
employees have the opportunity to withdraw the compulsorily saved funds from
savings accounts. Just because no experiences existed in this matter, there
were different hypotheses about the success of these measures.
A
second difficulty arises from the circumstance that at almost all the political
measures a part of the population will be disadvantaged, and that this part of
the population will strive to avoid these disadvantages. A rational policy will
need to include these potential avoidance mechanisms in their consideration.
Here, it must be expected that the policy will always lag behind the
development, because the burdened groups are constantly developing new
behaviors in order to escape this burden.
If
e.g. the state tries to slow down the consumer demand in the framework of a
Keynesian policy of fighting inflation by tax increases, and if the trade
unions strive to compensate the by the tax increase expected reduction in the
net wage income through increases in the gross wage rates, then just by this
behavior of trade unions the efficiency of tax increases will be reduced. If
the state nevertheless strives to remain successful in fighting inflation, it
requires flanking measures to avert this danger.
Such a
flanking measure could e.g. consist in that the state uses financial incentives
for the introduction of a participation wage. If now the trade unions try, due
to these government incentives, to avert the reduction of their income by means
of financial statements of participation wage contracts, the policy remains
successful to fight inflation, at least when we assume, following the
demand-driven inflation theory, that participation wages do not act price
increasing.
Furthermore,
flanking measures can become necessary also for a second reason. In general, we
must in fact assume that the problem sizes of economic theory depend on several
determinants and that is why several means must be used in order to get
successful. Let us take again the example of the economic policy.
According
to the Keynesian idea the attempt will be made to revive the economy by a
deficit-financed increase in government expenditures. Now it is feared on the
part of neoclassicists that the additional supply of securities on the capital
market exerted by the state leads to interest rate increases, and that
therefore private investments decrease and that thus the success of the
economic revival will be nullified or at least reduced. To prevent this crowding
out, the Keynesian economic policy now tries to persuade the central bank
to an expansion of the money supply; in this case, the interest rate increases
are reversed, so that the feared crowding out holds off.
4 The question
about negative secondary effects
Political
measures generally do not only affect the variables that are to be influenced
by this measure. We rather have to assume that as a rule other variables are
influenced positively or negatively. If it is a matter of positive effects, we
speak of welcome side effects or positive secondary effects, but if other
variables are tangent negatively, then there are negative secondary effects on
hand.
Positive
secondary effects are e.g. at hand, when growth policy measures do not only
affect the economic growth positively as desired, but do also affect the
employment. These effects are unproblematic; we thus do not want to deal any
longer with these effects subsequently.
Negative
secondary effects are at hand, however, e.g. if an expansive fiscal policy
(deficit-financed increase of government expenditure) leads not only to the
intended employment increases, but at the same time effects negatively -
unintentionally, perhaps not even expected - on the inflation rate. This type
of secondary effects brings a number of problems along with which we want to
deal in more detail in the following.
Negative
secondary effects are closely linked to the problem of conflicting aims. One
and the same connection exists when we speak of means related trade-offs or of
negative secondary effects. The adverse impact of an employment policy to the
inflation rate, for example, means that the aim of full employment is in
conflict with the aim of monetary stability.
In a
much greater extent than it is true for the efficiency analysis, we have to
assume that for the effects which are classified as secondary effects there is
no sufficient theoretical knowledge at hand, so that it can only be speculated
about possible secondary effects, so that often the presence of certain
secondary effects is known only much later.
To
this, let us first consider the applied procedure in the context of efficiency
analysis. It is the concern of a theory to inform over preferably all
determinants of a problem size. So the Keynesian inflation theory assumes that
only the increase in the effective demand is responsible for goods price
increases; as we subdivide the total demand in consumption, investment,
government and finally export expenditures, we have included with this list all
known possible determinants of inflation (in opinion of the Keynesians).
This
target completeness in the number of determinants is generally also possible,
because we can assume that this connection between determinants and problem
variables takes place in a relatively short, reasonable time and can therefore
also be detected at an accurate empirical observation, generally.
Other
applies generally to the occurrence of secondary effects. Here one usually
assumes that prolonged periods elapse before the undesirable secondary effects of
a measure occur. Let us take again the example of a Keynesian employment
policy. The theory teaches us that positive employment effects can already be
detected very soon after increase in government spending. Finally, government
expenditures which are used for the purchase of goods and services pose already
income growth.
In the
context of the inflation theory it is, however, pointed out that these state
expenditure increases generally also lead to price increases, but that the time
lag situated between expenditure growth and inflation is substantially greater
than the time lag between expenditure increase and employment growth.
This
is also the reason for the popularity of an expansionary employment policy
among politicians. If they start with these measures shortly before the
election, they can hope that the employment increases will still have a
positive effect on the election, but that the undesirable price increases occur
only after the election, and will therefore not influence voter behavior. Since
it can be assumed that the voters forget relatively quickly and their voting
behavior depends solely on the events just before the election, the inflation
effects will not be counted against the politicians also in the long run.
Just
this prolonged period of occurrence of secondary effects now brings about that
within the framework of the efficiency analysis we may have theories that list
preferably all of the known determinants, but that there is no theory that
summarizes all the possible secondary effects. If we inquire about the
secondary effects of an expansionary employment policy, we learn about the to
be expected price increases of the inflation theory, about the growth effects
of the growth theory, about the adverse distribution effects of the
distribution theory and about the possible misallocation of the allocation
theory.
These
different procedures within the framework of the efficiency- and secondary
effect analysis now bring along that the progress in the development of
theories in connection with the secondary effects is much lower than in
connection with efficiency problems. If namely the prognosticated effects of a
theory do not occur or obviously other determinants of the occurrence of a
problem size are accountable, so there is also a strong incentive to modify the
theory. In the context of research the necessity results to modify a theory
until finally all identifiable determinants of a problem size are included in
the theory.
The
process of knowledge discovery takes place quite differently in the context of
secondary effects. There is no method of falsification, if we have assumed so
far the false hypothesis that an expansionary employment policy affects only
the inflation rate but does not have a negative effect on the allocation. It is
not a single theory, but only parts of quite different theories that are on
trial, so it is missing here the incentive to check, whether not also secondary
effects on other problem sizes are to be expected. It is more a matter of
chance that one comes across secondary effects and this applies all the more
the less such connections are suspected and the longer the period of time
elapses until these secondary effects occur. For these reasons may the analysis
of secondary effects be to a greater extent of a speculative nature than the
efficiency analysis.
Just
for these reasons, on introducing new measures negative secondary effects are
often prognosticated, which then have not occurred at all. And on the other
side negative secondary effects of major extent have been overlooked which are
only found in hindsight, perhaps actually not until many decades after the
introduction of a measure.
The
straightening of rivers, e.g. the Rhine, was celebrated as a great success in
the history of Germany, because rivers became navigable in this way. Waterways
emerged in this way, the travel costs have been reduced dramatically, and thus
the productivity of the economy could have been substantially increased
ultimately. Only much later - and in fact not until around a hundred years
later - the negative consequences of this straightening became visible, which
were reflected in multiplied and stronger inundations and high economic damage
costing billions.
If one
wants, one can count the financial costs of certain measures also to the
negative secondary effects. Economic policy measures often entail further
measures in the future, with the result that the financial costs associated
with this instrument are much higher than initially estimated. Three cases can
be distinguished here:
The
extent of the incurring costs depends on variables which extent increases over
time and therefore increases without modification of the law. We take the
example of the savings premium law of the 60s of the last century, which
provided that certain premiums were granted for long-term savings. At the
introduction of this measure only a relatively small part of the population
could make use of this law, with the consequence that the financial burden of
the state due to this law was initially very low.
In the
following period, however, more and more people came to enjoy this law because
of the general increase in income, so that the financial burden increased to an
extent that was not foreseen in this scope. This connection can now become a
problem if on the one hand such a law has been launched just because the
financial burden was low and if on the other hand it is politically difficult
to retract a measure again which has been carried out already for a long time.
A
second type of financial follow-up costs exists when the extension of the
measure gets necessary out of the inner logic. So the introduction of a dynamic
old age pension in 1957 was, among other things, based on that also transfer
income recipients should receive a compensation for price increases and a fair
participation of the economic growth. The inner logic of the pension reform of
1957 now brings along that other pensions such as e.g. injury pensions should
also be dynamized. Again, the introduction of a law
led in the long run to much more cost increases than initially assumed.
Thirdly,
financial follow-up costs can eventually occur also due to certain political
mechanisms. The fact that the state grants conservation subsidies for crises
occurrences in certain economic sectors can call other stakeholders from other
economic sectors on the scene and they can also ask for subsidies, arguing that
equal rights have to apply for all; if one part of the population is helped in
times of crisis, this aid has to be granted on the same terms to all economic
sectors. Thus, the volume of subsidies can increase dramatically.
5 The question
about the market conformity of means
Economic
measures may be checked continually as to how far they are compliant with the
economic system in which they are used. Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke have
formulated the criterion of market conformity for a market economical system.
Thereafter only such measures can be considered as compliant with the market
order which do not intervene directly in the market process and only change in
an indirect way the data which influence the economic decisions.
Among
the basic economic decisions are counted the determination of supply and demand
of goods quantities, their prices, the production technology as well as the
location of a production. A economic policy measure will be considered as
market conform as long as these decisions remain among private households and
enterprises; In fact they can influence the decision of the private, but the
private business entity has to decide as before whether it maintains the supply
or demand after the changed situation.
If the
state introduces e.g. a sales tax, it contributes to an increase in costs, and
this cost increase will usually lead to a change in the supply. Such data
change exists also if the state excludes certain alternatives. So could a
company increase their profits by fraudulent practices or by a monopolistic merger
with the other market partners, but the state prohibits these practices. Not
the prohibition of certain activities is hereby non-compliant to the market; as
long as the individual is not forced to a specific measure, as long as several
alternatives remain between which the individual is still able to decide
freely.
K. C. Thalheim has now criticized this criterion because it would
emphasize to much the qualitative side and would neglect the quantitative
aspects. He instead proposes to distinguish between system necessary, system
conducive, system neutral, system damaging and system destructive measures. A
monopolization of the bank notes creation was system necessary, competition of
enterprises was system conducive, the imposition of a sales tax was system
neutral, the introduction of prohibitive tolls was system damaging, galloping
inflation has to be regarded eventually as system destructive.
B.
Steinmann has also criticized the fact that the market conformity is measured
at Eucken only on the question, to what extent it is intervened in the market
process. However, Walter Eucken formulated seven constituent principles of a
market economical order and the market conformity had to be judged by the
extent to which each of these principles get attention. Although the
introduction of a prohibitive duty was no immediate intervention into the price
process, but it violated the principle of openness of the markets and therefore
had to be classified also as non-compliant to the market.
Finally,
Theodor Pütz has attempted to develop the criterion
of the market conformity further. Whether a particular measure may be
considered as market-conform would also depend on the surrounding
circumstances. So although national definitions of prices would be classified
as non-compliant to the market under normal conditions, but the same
interventions could help to stop a market economy threatening deflationary
spiral of price and wage reductions and be so far considered as market
compliant.
Secondly,
it would also depend on the area in which a measure is applied, monopolies are
generally market damaging, on the issue of banknotes, however, they are
indispensable for the functioning of the market economy.
Thirdly
and finally, also the extent of a measure would decide about the conformity,
slight expansions of the money supply may promote the process of economic
recovery; however, a doubling of the money supply in a short time would ruin
the economy in all likelihood.
The
criterion of the market conformity emphasizes certain characteristics that
generally can be checked relatively easy. It is a question of classificatory
assignment. In contrast, at the criterion of secondary effects the effect
connections were emphasized which are not always openly obvious and can only be
checked with the help of a theory.
Now we
have to be clear on that even the conformity criterion is often associated with
the idea that market non-conform measures entail unwanted effects and endanger
the stability of the market economy. So Walter Eucken has advanced the
hypothesis that planned economy measures were not limited to individual
markets, but rather entail more planned economy measures in other areas. With
the consequence that this process eventually would inevitably end in a total
command economy.
One
can now doubt whether combined systems are in fact unstable and necessarily end
in a total command economy, eventually the post-war economy in Germany has
started as a combined system and the planned economy elements have been removed
gradually. Nevertheless, the experience with economic planning interventions
shows that a limitation of those measures to a single market is not possible.
So leads e.g. an artificial shortage on a market to a shortage on all
downstream markets. Here, complementarity and substitutability decide how
strong the expansion of individual market conformities will be in detail.
6 The political
feasibility of means
In the
chapter about the aims of economic policy we had investigated the question of
the realism of individual aims. Similarly, with regard to political means the
question can be asked whether these means can be used politically at all. The
constitutions determine which policy measures are allowed and which are not
allowed.