01.
Approaches
02.
Methods
03.
Target analysis
04.
Means analysis
05.
Institution analysis
06.
Political economy
07.
Welfare economy
08.
Order analysis
09.
Order conception
10.
Order dynamics
Outline:
0th Introduction
1th The question about the features of
political institutions
2th The question about the intrinsic
value: The subsidiarity principle
3th The question about the intrinsic
value: The centralism
4th The question about the intrinsic
value: The democracy precept
5th The problem of the conflict of
interests
6th The problem of the lacking resources
0th Introduction
The contribution of economic policy teaching
to the institution analysis consists in the answering of the following
questions:
Firstly, what are the characteristic
features of an institution? Similar to the means analysis, the superiority of
an institution can here also be determined only if previously the specific
differences of the individual institutions are known (question of the
characteristic features of an institution).
Secondly, it must be checked whether a
certain positive or negative intrinsic value is awarded to a particular institution,
regardless of its suitability for solving the tasks entrusted to it (Question
about an intrinsic value of an institution).
Thirdly, it must be checked whether in
some circumstances the self-interest of a possible institution complicates the
acceptance of certain tasks because conflicts of interests are given (question
about a conflict of interests)?
Fourthly and finally, the suitability of
an institution could fail because an institution does dispose of the resources
which are indispensable for the realization of certain tasks (question about
the lack of opportunities).
1th The question about the features of
political institutions
For the characterization of an institution
the decision-making process is crucial. Only when an institution would be
merely of one person, the question of how the unified will of this institution
comes about was unnecessary. Generally, however, a carrier represents an
institution which consists of a variety of people, and here it is of importance
for the question of the suitability of an institution, how a process will
proceed. Two questions arise in this context:
Firstly, how is the will of an organ
consisting of several persons detected? This is the question about the voting
rules. Secondly, it is necessary to determine which factors work towards a
compromise which brings the, at first different, ideas of the individual
members together.
The voting rules determine whether, for
example, unanimity is necessary or whether a simple or a qualified majority is
required, further, how to proceed in the event of a tie. The importance of
voting rules for the suitability of an institution gets immediately apparent
when one considers that an organ which can act only by unanimity remains
incapable of acting on most issues.
Of equal importance as the voting rules
are the agreement mechanisms of the institution. In general, we have to assume
that at the beginning of the decision-making process prevail very different
opinions among the members of the decision-making bodies. Therefore, a
mechanism is required that allows a compromise between the various opinions.
Firstly, one is able to assume that common
cultural values, furthermore, the affiliation to a party works towards that
certain common fundamental convictions consist and that therefore differences
of opinion stay within limits.
The logrolling (the Vote Trading)
represents another agreement mechanism. Here, one group is willing to give in
to the respectively other subgroup at a partial question, if this in turn
expresses willingness to accommodate in another issue of the first subgroup.
The joint discussion can lead to an
agreement, if in this way the information horizon can be extended and
misunderstandings can be cleared up by bringing forward factual arguments.
However, the discussion will only be able to lead to an agreement if the
differences of opinion are based on factual questions and if both discussion
partners emanate from the same or at least similar basic ideas.
Finally, the fact that there is
uncertainty in some questions can contribute to an agreement, too. So the
agreement will can increase if it is unknown whether a group already has the
majority. Here, one secures the majority in the way that one makes concessions
to some subgroups and wins these for the own position.
Further, D. C. Mueller, an American
economist and representative of Modern Political Economy and others have
pointed out that the uncertainty about whom certain measures finally benefit
can produce a willingness to compromise.
Thus, distribution problems would only be
hardly resolvable in the context of everyday politics, but approached easier in
the constitution. The individual adopts a quasi-altruistic attitude when out of
the uncertainty as to whether he is among the winners or losers of a measure he
comes to the decision according to more objective criteria.
If a rich man could be sure that a certain
measure of redistribution had a reduction of his assets or net income as a
result, then he would use any means available (especially through lobbying
activities) to ensure that this legislative proposal will fail in parliament.
One also has to worry that these attempts lead to success very often.
However, if this measure is applied in the
very long term, this rich one can expect that the same measure may possibly
benefit also his children and grandchildren. After all, even the rich families
are also not immune to that they can meet the misfortune one day.
But as it is absolutely unclear which of
these opportunities for rich families can occur actually, this rich one has to
assume that both options (benefits or losses) have the same probability and in
this case an action against this measure would be irrational. It is then equiprobable that this measure is useful or even harmful to
his children. He then behaves exactly as if he would decide altruistic.
Measures which are applied in the very long term - for example, in the constitution
– thus, lead to a quasi-altruistic behavior.
Finally, an agreement may also be forced
thereby that it is threatened with formal or informal sanctions, such as for
example, with the expulsion from the party if certain party members are not
willing to agree to the general solution sketched out by the party leadership.
In connection with the question of which
properties now the individual institutions under discussion have, it is not
only to determine whether a competition between multiple institutions exists,
to which institution a task shall be transferred expediently, it must also be
seen that in certain cases a task is to be transmitted to multiple institutions
together. So is the execution of social welfare primarily a responsibility of
the municipalities, nevertheless, the funding can be borne mainly by the
countries or even from the parent state.
A first form of coordination consists
therein that from the outset a clear separation of duties is determined which
makes all other coordination efforts unnecessary. So had H. G. Johnson and R.
A. Mundell famously suggested that the central bank alone should be responsible
for external monetary stability (for equilibrating the foreign exchange
balance), whereas the government should be responsible for the internal
economic stabilization.
However, such a simple division of tasks
is not possible in many cases, because in a dynamic, changing world always new
tasks arise in which no allocation of competence was yet possible. It is also
questionable whether in each case a clear separation of duties brings the best
results, since this kind of separation of duties creates monopolistic
positions, thereby promoting the possible abuse of power.
A second possibility of external
coordination results from the principle of competing allocation of competences,
such as those provided, for example, by the basic law on the issue of division
of responsibilities between federal and state governments. In principle,
federation and countries have the right to take the initiative for political
reform measures. But if both instances intend to become active in these areas
at the same time, the power lies with a predetermined executive agency. Under
such a scheme, the chance is significant that certain problems are addressed,
as the problem resolution is approached both, when the federation and also when
the countries are interested in the realization of these tasks. Also the
competition between the authorities can increase performance.
A third kind of external coordination
consists in that the involved institutions bring about a compromise in joint
negotiations. This kind is chosen especially in collaborative projects at
international level; but also the collective bargaining are among this form of
compromise, unless one is willing to look at private organs as institutions of
economic policy actions. Negotiations are mainly successful when negotiating
partners have exchange options as well as thread potential.
Negotiations can also be led to a success
by the consultation of an external arbitrator. However, here arises the
problem, for which reason an arbitrator should be successful if the bargaining
parties alone find no agreement and if the acceptance of the arbitration
decision cannot be enforced. Here, the arbitration dilemma arises: Why it
requires an arbitrator, if there is a solution, which both negotiators can
agree with voluntarily, in this case, why do not find the negotiating partners
alone the solution without the consultation of an external arbitrator? But if
the negotiating partners do not know any solution that both partners can agree
with, why should an arbitrator be successful? How can this dilemma be solved?
A first possibility of a successful
arbitration is when emotions come up during the negotiations and when the
negotiating partners therefore persist in irrational positions, and therefore
disagree also with such compromises that would be acceptable for both partners
thoroughly with rational judgment. Here, the task of the arbitrator would be to
urge the partners to rational behavior.
A second possibility for a successful
arbitration is given if the individual partners try to improve their position
by bluffing strategies during negotiation, and that it is seen from the
opposite side quite possible that it is simply a bluff and that precisely in
this way the mutual trust to each other dwindles. Here, an agreement could be
prevented even if solutions thoroughly exist which both partners could agree
with. Task of the arbitrator is in these cases to recover mutual confidence.
A third arbitration function may lie
therein when the arbitrator takes a strong position and can persuade the
partners to a compromise that those would not have gone by themselves, as there
is the risk that a compromise leads to a loss of confidence among the members.
This loss of confidence is lower when the chief negotiators are virtually forced
to this compromise than when they enter into the compromise by their own
volition.
Compromise possibilities rise also if the
arbitrator has the opportunity to reward a yielding, either through financial incentives
(a state arbitrator could promise subsidies in case of an agreement) or in that
a partner loses prestige in the public because of the absence of compliancy.
A final arbitration function may be that
the arbitrator will get innovatively active and presents with his arbitration a
solution which was so far unknown to both partners. So made, as it is well
known, Erwin Häußler in 1954 as arbitrator the previously unknown proposal to
grant a part of the wage increases in form of a participation wage.
A very different kind of coordination is
present in the political leadership. One of the involved institutions stalks
ahead, the other institutions are willing to follow suit.
Finally, in this connection the
possibility of automatic adjustment shall be mentioned, as discussed e.g.
within the scope of the oligopoly theory. Thus, e.g. could the policy of
municipalities at the fixation of municipal rates bring about such an automatic
compromise, in which the municipality rates take here the same role as the prices
of goods of the oligopolistic.
The amount of the municipal rates would
depend in this case, among other things, on the level of municipal rates in a
neighboring community, as communities would always have to fear that at
relatively high municipal rates a migration to neighboring communities takes
place. Under certain conditions this automatism of mutual adjustment of
municipal rates - as the oligopoly theory has shown - can eventually lead to an
equilibrium in which the communities see no more reason to revise their
municipal rates.
2th The question about the intrinsic
value: The subsidiarity principle
We already mentioned that with regard to
the institution problem it has to be expected that certain institutions are
preferred, it is not because they are considered as better suited for the task,
but because this institution is granted a positive intrinsic value.
In this connection the so-called
subsidiarity principle plays a decisive role. According to this principle,
which was recommended primarily by the Christian social ethics, it should first
be checked whether certain public tasks could not be performed by the
municipalities, i.e. the political bodies at the lowest level. Only when
certain tasks could not be properly embraced by the lowest organs, these tasks
should be assigned to the next higher organ.
The subsidiarity principle refers to two
problem areas: on one hand the tension relationship between individual and
community. So here it is essential to emphasize the rights and duties of the
individual towards the community. On the other hand, the subsidiarity principle
says also something about the relationship between the subordinate and
superordinate community.
After a very popular, but not quite exact
interpretation the subsidiarity principle emphasizes thus the priority of the
individual (or the subordinate community) over the (superordinate) community.
Only when the individual (or the subordinate community) will not cope with
specific tasks alone, the superordinate community had the right to intervene
subsidiary in the issues. Each relocation of societal tasks from the state to
the free professional associations, or to the companies, or finally to the
families is endorsed according to this interpretation of the subsidiarity
principle, regardless of what form of community can solve the respective
problem more properly and more expediently. As e.g. the problem of the
equalization of family burdens was transferred to the professional
associations, it was spoken of a solution according to the principle of
subsidiarity.
The here stipulated priority of the
individual can refer to an order on a value basis, but also to a chronological
order. If one thinks of a chronological order, then one entitles the individual
the right to first of all cope with the current problems alone. Only then, when
the practice has shown that the individual cannot cope with this problem, the
superordinate community will step in assisting.
But if one thinks of an order on a value
basis, then the theoretical consideration of whether a particular task can be
solved by the individuals themselves is sufficient. If this question is
answered in the negative, then the state has immediately the right to approach
the solution of these tasks. Mostly in the literature it is only thought of
this value based order.
But even with an only value-based priority
of the individual, the principle of subsidiarity has undergone a too narrow
interpretation, here. At least, is this interpretation understandable in our
present historical situation and also partly justified. Our modern mass society
has led to strong collectivization tendencies. In order to fight these
collectivization tendencies effectively, it is necessary to emphasize the
importance of the individual and of the subordinated communities more than
ever. Of course there are also today tasks that are still solved better and
more appropriate by the state (by the respectively superordinate community). It
is not necessary, however, to point this out in public, because with today´s strong
collectivization tendencies there is not a lacking, but an excess of government
activity up for discussion.
A second interpretation of the
subsidiarity principle draws on the original text: thereafter, the task of the
state and of the superordinate communities confines itself to provide for the
individual, respectively the subordinate community, an assistance, thus, a help
for self-help. But also here an objection is justified. Help for self-help is
certainly a very important, but by no means the only task of the state.
Now, what is the full meaning of the
subsidiarity principle? Each individual and each community form is suitable for
certain types of tasks due to its natural disposition (structure). According to
the subsidiarity principle shall the fullness of issues arising in a society
now be allocated to the individuals and the individual communities in the way
that each will be entrusted with the tasks for which he is most qualified due
to his natural structure.
This can be in the specific case the
individual, the enterprise, the association, but also very often the state. A
priori without knowledge of the special abilities and advantages of the
individuals, as well as all forms of community, and without knowledge of the
specific problem situation it is impossible to determine whether the individual
or a specific community form has to be preferred in the concrete individual
case. Rather, it requires in each case an appropriate solution to the present
problem-and this proper solution can only be found on the basis of a thorough
investigation on the actual advantages of the single community forms.
Therefore, one may quite possible take the view that the problem of the family
burdens equalization can be solved more appropriate by the state as of the professions
or enterprises and one still does not offend against the principle of subsidiarity.
The subsidiarity principle can therefore
be formulated negatively as well as positively. The first historical
interpretation was certainly a purely negative formulation. It restricts the
claims of the state towards the individuals. However, this purely negative
formulation is not sufficient; it also requires a positive formulation. These
we have found in our second and third interpretation of this principle.
Thereafter, the respective superordinate community has to deal with their
specific tasks and one of these specific tasks is the help for self-help.
The principle of subsidiarity does not
only talk of rights but also of duties. It is the right of the individual to be
allowed to solve by himself the problems that are satisfactorily solvable by
himself, too. He has, though, also the obligation to do so. Perhaps one should
just point out to the second aspect of the subsidiarity principle in our day
and age. All too often, the individual spares his own responsibility, and often
he lacks of his own initiative, he is too lazy to act on one´s own person and
he also gladly lets the tasks, that he could solve better, be fulfilled by the
state.
Precisely in this dangerous attitude lies
one (though not the only) of the reasons for the above-stated collectivization
tendency. Where the individual leaves a vacuum, the superordinate community
pushes forward.
These considerations apply not only to the
subordinate, but also to the superordinate communities. If the individual
cannot help himself, the state has not only the right but also the duty to
intervene.
Often the question is asked whether the
principle of subsidiarity constitutes not only a purely formal principle, which
basically does not allow to answer any of the real problems. This concern
applies in fact to many formulations of this principle made in public. Thus,
for example, the principle of subsidiarity is often paraphrased with the
formula: "As much freedom as possible, as much compulsion as
necessary." With this answer it is still not clear how much freedom then
is possible and how much compulsion then is necessary, especially remains unclear
who has to decide how these two questions have to be answered.
Anyway, quite different solutions of
current problems can be justified with this abbreviated formulation. Who speaks
up just for the solution of a problem on a state level, will always argue that
government regulation is necessary and vice versa will the one who calls for an
individual solution deny just this necessity. It always requires also a
substantive provision of the principle of subsidiarity. The subsidiarity
principle has to be preceded always by a superior standard. This standard then
refers to the respective public service obligations.
In which manner can the subsidiarity
principle be applied in the business? Our market economy is characterized
precisely by the fact that it transmits the most important economic decisions
to the households and the free enterprises and that to the state only a
regulatory function belongs within the economy that abstains from any direct
intervention in the market.
In a market economy the production does
not take place due to a central economic plan, established by the state, but
due to a large number of individual plans, which are finally coordinated by the
market forces of the price and the mutual competition to a meaningful, overall
economic plan without governmental assistance.
This decentralization in the economic
decisions stops, though, at the enterprise. The individual companies are
nowadays structured hierarchically centrally in the majority of cases. Eugen
Schmalenbach and others have therefore asked justifiably whether this central
structure of the enterprises does not constitute a foreign body in a free
market economy. Should it not be possible, to find as well as for the whole
economy also for the individual enterprise a decentralized system, which can
still achieve satisfactorily the tasks with witch the enterprise is confronted
with?
In this case, the individual workers would
be autonomously acting economic agents, which would comply in their workplace
their tasks on their own responsibility by means of certain specifications such
as, for example, transfer prices. The task of the enterprise would then
primarily be to provide to the individual employees a workplace that is
machines and tools and to set transfer prices and other specifications in a
manner that the employees, out of their own interest, take respectively the
decisions which guarantee for the fulfillment of the overall corporate aims. We
will later deal with problems of internal structure under the keyword:
Participation in more detail.
Now we had pointed out further above that
whenever the question of the intrinsic value of aims or means is addressed, the
economist would be unable to cope with deciding how this intrinsic value is
assessed. In other words, the claim of Max Weber for a value-freedom of science
is necessary here.
Basically, these restrictions also apply
to the question of how the indication to the intrinsic value of an executive
agency should be assessed. Nevertheless, this judgment applies only to a
limited extent for the subsidiarity principle, as we have seen, that properly
understood the subsidiarity principle requires an allocation of societal tasks
according to the suitability of the individual agencies. But the question of
the better suitability of an agency is indeed a question that can be decided
with scientific arguments.
Closely related to the principle of
subsidiarity is the federalism. The parliaments of representative democracies
generally consist of two chambers. Thus, for example, the Parliament in the FRG
consists of the Bundestag, the representation of the people and the Federal
Council, in which the interests of the federal states are represented. Or else
in the USA there is besides the House of Representatives the Senate, which in
turn represents the interests of the individual federal states.
Common to both countries (the FRG and the
USA) is that they are federal states in which at the union of different
countries to a federation not the entire state authority has been delegated to the
central body of the state, but a part of the state authority continues to
remain at the countries as before.
The federalism is now demanding that the
actual state authority lies with the federal states, which then transfer the
tasks to the federal government, which can not be or only less well perceived
of the headquarters than of the individual federal states. Also here, the
priority of the subordinate forms of community is demanded as with the
principle of subsidiarity.
3th The question about the intrinsic
value: The centralism
An opposite standpoint to the subsidiarity
principle takes the centralism which strives to transfer all substantial
decisions to the central, thus to the highest level. Just as at the
subsidiarity principle, where a positive intrinsic value is attributed to the
transfer of a task to the lowest level, so the centralism sees a positive value
therein when the headquarters can take all substantial decisions itself.
Now, with which arguments is centralism
justified? Firstly, it has to be advised that the centralism throughout history
grew out of the desire of the rulers to expand their power and to retain as
much power as possible to themselves. The rulers in the Middle Ages often
understood themselves as called of God and therefore entitled to attract
possibly all power to themselves. Other rulers were convinced that there is no
need at all to justify their exercise of authority, that in accordance with a
kind of Darwinian principle in a social selection process, the more powerful
prevails.
But even if the rulers are convinced that
there is no need to justify their striving for power, they considered it
expedient to justify their power therewith that a pooling of power at a central
body is superior to all other forms of exercise of power. Just the fact that
the ruler was able to win out over his opponents with success, would show that
he possesses the better knowledge of how societal problems will be resolved
expediently.
Friedrich von Hayek spoke in this context
of an arrogation of knowledge. No ever so much developed central authority
could have all the knowledge that the market provides automatically, thereby
that all decisions of individual households and enterprises are included in the
prices.
The very fact that also the centralism is
partly justified by that the central authorities have also the better
suitability as subordinated instances, in turn makes it possible for science to
co-operate in decision to whether the central bureaucracies of the state
actually have always better suitability for resolving existing societal tasks
than the subordinate communities (provinces, municipalities, etc.).
4th The question about the intrinsic
value: The democracy precept
A positive intrinsic value is also
addressed when the claim is made to organize democratically the decision-making
process internal to the institutions. However, this demand is interpreted quite
differently. So often this demand is understood in terms of a direct democracy
whereby the members of an organization should be involved in as many decisions
as possible and with high decision intensity. It is clear that this demand can
be answered the less, the greater the group is and the more different the
interests and ideas of the group members are. It then arises a conflict of
interests between efficient policies and democratic decision-making process.
Secondly, democracy can also be understood
in the sense of a representative democracy. Here, the actual decision-making
power lies with the executives. Here, the democratic character takes effect in
that the citizens can elect periodically the politicians, and that the
competition among the politicians automatically results in that the politicians
develop such activities which are also of benefit to the majority of the voters.
Thirdly, the demand for a democratic
structure is at times identified with the demand to grant equal rights and
duties to all citizens in the sense of equality. To this interpretation
corresponds that to each member one and only one vote is granted. However, it
must be pointed out that even with formal vote equality, the influence of the
individual group members may vary as e.g. citizens can exercise political
influence not only by elections, but also by associations, the ability to form
interest groups, however, is pronounced very differently. Thus, for example,
small groups are more easily to organize than large groups; or supplier interests
are more homogeneous than consumer interests and therefore easier to organize.
5th The problem of the conflict of
interests
An unsuitability of an institution for the
assumption of a particular societal task may be that in addressing this
problem, a conflict of interests arises. This is, for example, always the case when
the institution under discussion pursues own aims, which are in contradiction
with the tasks under discussion, here. In this case, it cannot be expected that
such an executive agency is committed to an optimal solution of the existing
problem.
We want to insinuate, for example, that a
political solution to the problem of the family burdens equalization is wanted.
An employee who has to provide for children should for the same performance
have a higher net income at disposal than a single person. Now will be examined
whether this task can be transferred to private enterprises; in other words
whether it is possible that the enterprises grant their employees a family fair
wage.
Now, the mutual competition of
entrepreneurs brings along that only such enterprise can survive, which
utilizes all possible cost reductions. Now, if one would entrust the
enterprises to provide a family-friendly wage, then would just the enterprises,
which adhere to this obligation to family wage, obtain competitive disadvantages
compared to the enterprises which do not comply with this obligation.
If one wanted to overcome this difficulty
by the fact that one would commit the entrepreneurs to family allowances, the
problem would still not be solved, because now there is the danger that some
enterprises would try to gain a competitive advantage in the way that they
employ as few workers with children as possible. Just out of these difficulties
one has concluded that the problem of family burdens equalization can only be
achieved appropriately thereby that this task is not entrusted to the
enterprises, but that in addition to the earnings the state grants subsequently
a child allowance.
Now, often is concluded from the mere fact
that certain institutions pursue individual aims that they are therefore
generally not suitable for public service missions, as well as from the fact
that public institutions are statutorily obliged to fulfill public service
missions, it is concluded that these institutions are suitable per se to
fulfill political tasks. Both views are wrong. Public service missions can be
met very well even with self-interest pursuit, as well as public corporations
may pursue self-interests of its executives despite public service obligations.
Liberalism has pointed out that under
certain requirements, especially in strong competition, just the self-interest
pursuit can contribute to the realization of the common good, because on free
competitive markets the enterprises maximize their profit just when they align
production to the needs of consumers. Liberalism pointed also out that
self-interest pursuit triggers much stronger incentives to reduce costs and
improve quality than the commitment to the common good behavior. Therefore, it
is not primarily a question of by what motives the political actors are guided,
but whether a functioning order exists which coordinates the various interests
so that the public good interests get a chance just when the individual
entrepreneur align their decisions to their own interests.
Joseph Alois
Schumpeter showed that the decisions of politicians also emerge from
self-interest concepts that the profit maximization as the main motive of the
entrepreneurs corresponds to the striving for vote maximization of the
politicians in a democracy. But here is true that a functioning democratic
order ensures that the decisions of politicians despite self-interest striving
are aligned to the common good ultimately. The competition among politicians
causes that the politicians improve their electoral chances just then if they
meet the aims of the majority of the voters.
6th The problem of the lacking resources
The suitability of an institution can also
fail because it does not have the possibilities to carry out certain tasks. In
this case, the institution is under circumstances willing to do everything
possible to fulfill the tasks assigned to him, but it does not have the
necessary prerequisites to achieve the task. In general, one can assume that
policy gets only effective thereby that the individuals are induced to a quite
particular behavior. There are several reasons why certain executive agencies
do not have these opportunities to influence.
Firstly, lack of possibilities can be due
to that the considered organ lacks of financial opportunities. Thus, it is
generally assumed that a stimulation of the economy requires such an extend of
spending increases that municipalities, but also the countries would be
overextended if one wanted to delegate this task to them; therefore, it
corresponds to a general conviction that only the federation (possibly in
cooperation with the states and municipalities) is able to operate an efficient
economic stabilization policy.
Secondly, the lack of influence of an
institution may also lie therein that an adequately trained staff of officials
is necessary to fulfill the entrusted tasks, and this is not present, however.
So could e.g. fail the containment of economic crime because the financial
administration does not have sufficient economic and financial experts who are
ever able to detect fraud at an early stage.
Finally, an executive agency may lack,
thirdly, of the ability to constrain the citizens to a very definite behavior.
Especially tasks of redistribution make it necessary that coercion is applied.
If we assume that it is considered to provide certain forms of redistribution
within the scope of the private insurance in favor of persons affected
disproportionately by social risk. However, a real redistribution is not
possible within the scope of a private insurance because the insurance members
that are affected negatively by such redistribution can escape the burden
through exiting the insurance.